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Marcin Malawski
Wartości "proceduralne"
gier kooperacyjnych
["Procedural" values for cooperative games]
982
Abstract
A new notion of a "procedural" value for cooperative TU games is proposed.
A procedural value is determined by an underlying procedure of sharing
marginal contributions to koalicje that form by random ordering of players
between the contributing player and his predecessors in the ordering.
The simplest procedural value is the
Shapley value obtaining under the procedure of every player just
retaining his entire marginal contribution. But different sharing rules lead
to other interesting values, including the "egalitarian solution" and the
Nowak and Radzik "solidarity value". The set of all procedural values is a
subset of all efficient, symmetric, linear and locally monotonic values,
and it is shown that the subset is proper. Some possible generalizations
are also briefly discussed.
Keywords: cooperative game, procedure, value, efficiency, monotonicity.
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