Andrzej Wieczorek

Elementary large games and an application to economies with many agents

805

Abstract

Elementary large (EL) games directly generalize the usual concept of n-matrix games ; the concept itself is implicitely included within the games with a continuum of players . EL-games also remind anonymous games with finitely many types of players, finitely many actions and distribution dependent payoffs; however, no aprior i distribution on the set of types is involved. Relevant features of equilibrated distributions can be studied in the framework of (nonlinear) complementarity procedures or (unconstained) optimization problems in a Euclidean space. EL-games are also very well fit to represent voting procedures or evolutionary processes. As an example o application, we present a model of production and consumption by a large number of agents; the equilibrating market mechanism is modelled there by actions of infinitely many small local corrective powers.